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Abstract: 
We are currently witnessing an alarmingly increasing array of attacks on secure infrastructures used 
for  industrial  and  commercial  purposes.  The  success  of  these  attacks  has  relied  heavily  on  an 
innovative stratagem. This stratagem makes use of digital certificates to devise malicious code or 
servers as trustworthy, ultimately deceiving end users. This has led to an escalating demand for 
forged or stolen valid digital certificates on the electronic black market. Certification Authorities 
(CA) themselves are now coming under fire. Virus reports have surfaced on malicious software 
whose sole purpose was to grab certificates from within certain CA's infrastructures. The growing 
popularity of these attacks, is putting in doubt the effectiveness of one of the pillars upon which 
security in the digital world is built, cryptography and digital signatures. What's to blame? 
In  a  phrase,  “Trust  by  Default”.  To  increase  the  usability  of  Public  Key  Infrastructure  (PKI) 
interactions, a number of Certification Authorities are pre-included in users‟ browsers and operating 
systems. These entities are trusted by default, and this trust is now being exploited. In this article we 
shall  try  to  shed  light  on  the  true  dimensions  and  implications  of  “trust  by  default”  in  PKI 
environments. We attempt to raise awareness about the severity of this kind of attacks, demystify 
the security challenges and identify unique security threats. We need to ring the alarm about trust 
related  issues  in  online  communications.  We  analyze  the  issue  from  an  Information  and 
Communication Security perspective and explore the notion of trust relations in this context. We 
support the doctrine, that trust should be built on informed judgment and this can only be achieved 
through  increased  openness.  Following  this,  we  put  forward  for  consideration,  a  number  of 
proposals that attempt to overcome the issue at hand, by increasing user side awareness and thus 
solution  effectiveness,  regarding  digital  certificate  transactions.  We  present  an  experimental 
mechanism that is able to provide users with customized digital certificate repositories based on an 
open crowd sourcing method.  
 1   Public Key Infrastructure and Trust 
Trust is not a new research topic in computer science, spanning areas as diverse as security and 
access  control  in  computer  networks,  reliability  in  distributed  systems,  game  theory  and  agent 
systems, and policies for decision making under [1]. For entities to perform secure communications 
over a network, implicated parties need to be assured of each other‟s identity and integrity; in 
essence, entities need to trust one another. This is not always possible, when parties lack prior 
knowledge of each other. This is where a trusted third party, vouches for  each other‟s identity. 
Digital certificates are used as a testament of trust in the digital world, verifying origin, authenticity 
and integrity. 
It is now 30 years since Diffie and Hellman published what would become a pivotal paper in the 
field  of  cryptography  [2],  which  introduced  a  number  of  pioneer  ideas,  including  Public  Key 
Encryption,  Digital  Signatures,  One  way  and  Trapdoor  functions.  Public  Key  cryptography 
currently realizes the concept of digital certificates and signatures, while providing a practical and 
elegant  mechanism  for  key  agreement.  Public  key  cryptography  makes  use  of  asymmetric 
cryptography in which essentially a key pair is used to achieve security; a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the fundamental architecture 
that enables the use of PKC (Public Key Cryptography) in the real world. A PKI infrastructure is 
comprised of several working units; the most essential unit being the Certification Authority (CA). 
The CAs essential role is to certify the key pair/identity binding, by digitally signing a data structure 
that contains some representation of the identity and a corresponding public key. This data structure 
is called a digital certificate. A CA uses its private key to digitally sign an end user certificate. PKI 
makes use of hierarchies of certification authorities. A PKI hierarchy can have one or more tiers. At 
the top of the hierarchy is a Root CA, which can delegate the ability to publish certificates on its 
behalf to subordinate CAs. Since users can request certificates from the subordinate CA, the Root 
CA can be offline to increase overall security. An inspecting entity accepts a certificate as valid, 
because it trusts the authenticity of the signing respective authority; this is often reported as a chain 
of trust. The trust anchor for the end digital certificate is the Root CA certificate. This is either an 
unsigned public key certificate or a self-signed certificate. 
Digital certificates today are used for two broad categories of trust related interactions, putting trust 
into communications and software. To achieve trusted communications, digital certificates are used 
to  authenticate  servers,  authenticate  clients,  encrypt  and  time-stamp  communications  (including 
emails), root list signing, revoked list signing and domain name system server trust and trust list 
signing encryption. But digital certificate usage is not limited to communications, as they are used 
for a wider  range of security related interactions,  which include code  signing, hardware driver 
verification, system component verification, digital rights validation, application policy signing, 
kernel code signing and document signing. Popular operating systems and Internet browsers verify 
digital signatures and often prompt users to get consent before authorizing software execution 
In this environment, it is critical for a user to verify the validity of a digital certificate, but how can 
a user do this? How can an end user trust a “CA” to authorize third parties to execute code on his or 
her personal computer or to authenticate online commercial services? Ellison and Schneier, have 
stressed on the importance of trust relations in PKI environments, “in cryptographic literature, a CA 
defined as trusted, only means that it is assumed that it handles its own private keys well. This does 
not mean you can necessarily trust a certificate from that CA for a particular purpose: making a 
micro-payment or signing a million dollar purchase order. Who gave the CA the authority to grant 
such authorizations? Who made it trusted?”[3]. 
 2   Trust by default 
For PKI to work in the real world, an average user is required to have the ability to validate the 
information presented to him in a X.509 certificate format [4]. A PKI system, trusts its users will 
efficiently validate each other‟s certificates and effectively protect their private keys. PKI strength 
can be summarized down to specific end user trust judgments, regarding the validity of certificate 
holders and ultimately certificate issuers. If an end user erroneously trusts a malicious CA, he/she 
will successively trust all entities certified by this authority (trust is transitive). As no automated 
mechanism  for  evaluating  and  managing  the  trust  relationships  between  relying  parties  and 
certificate issuers exists, to make an effective trust judgment about the validity of a specific public 
key certificate, an end user is required to evaluate an extensive list of critical parameters, certificate 
hierarchies and cross certified authorities [5]. 
For example, when a secure session is to be established, a browser checks that the SSL certificate of 
an implicated server is trusted and valid. Specifically, the browser validates, the trustworthiness of 
the certification path, up to a trusted CA; that the certificate has not expired or been revoked; that 
the domain name in the certificate matches the domain name of the site being accessed; that the 
hash value of the certificate‟s content is signed, that the signature is included in the certificate and it 
is valid; and that the allowed usages of the digital certificate include the SSL usage. If any of these 
checks fail, an alert is presented to the user to select whether to proceed, cancel the session or re-
view the certificate. At this point, a user is required to make an informative decision on the validity of a digital certificate and thus, the trusted status of implicated entities. PKI strength and overall 
efficiency  of  the  security  solution  is  summed  up  to  the  validity  of  these  decisions.  Hence  the 
problem, as  recent studies show that users are unable to make such decisions effectively[6–8]; 
something that is also clear with the rise of what is now known as false certificate attacks (these 
attacks  present  users  with  invalid  certificates  that  raise  a  warning  but  users  still  accept 
reflexively)[9].  Notably  many  popular  Internet  browsers  have  certificate  revocation  checking 
mechanisms off-by-default, leaving it up to the user to enable supported settings [10]. A devastating 
majority of Internet users, either business or social, currently lack the basic ability, knowledge or 
even willingness to effectively use cryptographic applications, in a way that can successfully deter 
imminent threats. The complexity of this task is the Achilles' heel of public key cryptography, as it 
dawns on user friendliness, overall usability and thus solution efficiency[11][12][13][14][15][16]. 
Digital certificates are currently believed unusable due to their complexity[17]; Straubs analysis of 
PKI  usability  issues  with  reference  to  electronic  email  [11]  and  Gutmanns  documentation  of 
usability issues with reference to deployment problems[12]. These attempts focus mostly on PKI 
issues in relation to encrypted email and set-up complexity, as the dangers of semantic and trust 
attacks only recently surfaced. Tools that have been proposed to enhance user informativeness and 
enable efficient interactions with digital certificates are either in the form of toolbars (TrustBar [18]) 
whose efficiency is in doubt as it is believed that users do not pay them the required attention 
[6][19]  or  are  complex  tools  aimed  at  specific  applications  that  end  users  are  unable  to  use 
(WebTrustCA,  Lime  [20]).  Attackers  have  increasingly  exploited  this  weakness  with  phishing-
attacks; a few years ago the certification industry responded with a new technology named extended 
validation  or  high  assurance  certificates,  which  attempted  to  provide  users  with  additional 
information  about  the  certificate  ownership  and  attest  to  the  identity  of  a  legitimate  business. 
Unfortunately though recent reports are showing that these certificates make little if any difference 
to the end users[21].   
To deal with such issues, software companies have pre-included a bundle of root certificates, which 
have been audited for security purposes, into user browsers and operating systems. In the name of 
user friendliness and interoperability, all web browsers and operating systems currently contain a 
“Trusted Root Store” of certificate issuing authorities. Certificates issued from these organizations, 
or  subordinate  authorities,  are  transparently  trusted  by  relying  entities.  These  certificates  are 
automatically deemed as secure and trustworthy, as opposed to those issued by “unknown” issuers, 
which a relying party is warned not to trust. This essentially interprets into certificates published by 
all authorities that have not been included in the root store. Such approaches attempt to make the 
provision  of  system  security  „„automatic‟‟  or  „„transparent‟‟,  essentially  removing  judgment  or 
decision making process from the end user. In this way, a number of security judgments have been 
silently  delegated  to  intermediate  entities,  such  as  Internet  browsers  and  operating  systems, 
obscuring  relying  parties  from  any  intervention  in  the  process.  To  put  it  simply,  the  operating 
systems and web browser industry have trusted a number of certification authorities on behalf of the 
end user, in the name of user friendliness and usability. Microsoft, Google and Mozilla software 
currently considers trustworthy 1,482 CAs and 651 organizations (root and subCAs)[22]. These 
organizations  are  “trusted  by  default”  for  a  number  of  purposes  including  server  and  client 
authentication but also in many cases, software execution.  The Mozilla project Root CA store 
includes certificates issued by CAs in China, Israel, Bermuda, South Africa, Estonia, Romania, 
Slovakia, Spain, Norway, Colombia, France, Taiwan, UK, The Netherlands, Turkey, USA, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Hungary, Germany, and Switzerland. Why should an end-user in the USA blindly trust 
a government related CA in China? As a security sensitive user recently posted on LinuxNet, “I 
have no idea who "TÜRKTRUSTElektronikSertifikaHizmetSağlayıcısı" is or why I should trust 
anything they sign?”  3   Eroding the trust 
In most cases, an end user trusts his web browser, assuming that it will perform as expected. The 
same strong assumption is also adopted for operating systems. However, what a user does not 
expect is that his or her trust is actually transitive to a number of third parties (Figure 1). Trusting a 
CA through a web  browser is  a strong assumption, leading  to  very important  consequences  in 
respect to security. Some of the consequences for a regular user, are that he/she is blindly accepting 
websites as valid, signed code as original and secure, signed messages as authenticated etc. Despite 
the severe consequences in security, an end-user hardly knows anything about these entities he/she 
trusts.  This  dis-empowerment  contradicts  any  law  of  “usable  security”,  evidently  limiting  the 
efficiency of this security mechanism. Security software is only defined as usable, if the people who 
are expected to use it [16]: 
•  are reliably made aware of the security tasks they need to perform; 
•  are able to figure out how to successfully perform those tasks; 
•  don‟t make dangerous mistakes; 
•  are sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it; 
In  situations  where  only  the  end-user  can  determine  the  appropriate  use  of  information  or  the 
necessary  levels  of  security,  this  explicit  disempowerment  becomes  problematic  [23].  This 
delegation of trust decisions to intermediate entities, while increasing usability, decreases user-side 
awareness and evidently a user‟s ability to effectively engage in trust decisions, thus proposing a 
serious vulnerability. 
Additionally, this “trust by default” seems to break one of the principal laws of computer security; 
that developers, administrators and end users should be unwilling to trust. This is a doctorine that 
the security community has had in high respect for a long time. Trust needs to be earned and not be 
taken for granted. Trusting by default a number of organizations which a user may never even 
interact  with,  introduces  unnecessary  risk.  The  National  Institute  of  Standards  and  Technology 
(NIST)  in  the  Special  Publication  800-27  Engineering  Principles  for  Information  Technology 
Security[24], states that a system should minimize the elements that need to be trusted to secure an 
information system. Each of these default trust points, propose a possible system breach point. A 
number  of  the  default  CA‟s,  mitigate  their  trustworthiness  down  long  chains,  to  guaranteeing 
browser compatibility. Security is a chain; it‟s only as strong as its weakest link. The security of any 
CA-based system is based on many links. As the number of intermediate certification authorities 
grows, the trust chain weakens analogously. 
While  academia  and  the  industry  have  been  debating  the  issue  for  some  time  now,  malicious 
attackers have recognized the vulnerability and have recently launched an array of sophisticated 
attacks, exploiting the “predefined” trust status of many CA's.  
Figure 1: A users trust is transitive to a number of 
organisations We are now in the aftermath of the highly popularized Flame, Duqu and Stuxnet attacks. But what 
are the true dimensions and implications of these. The STUXNET virus seems to have opened 
Pandora‟s Box for these types of attacks. STUXNET gained popularity when it targeted highly 
sensitive Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which monitor and control 
industrial infrastructure. In addition to exploiting four zero-day vulnerabilities, it used two digital 
certificates for source code signing to  give it credibility and trusted privileges;  thus  remaining 
undetected for a long period of time[25–27]. In late 2011, a malicious piece of software named 
DUQU surfaced, which was soon branded as the precursor to the next STUXNET. The threat is 
believed to have been written by the same authors (or those that have access to the Stuxnet source 
code) and appears to have been created since the last Stuxnet file was recovered [28]. Although 
DUQU does not contain any code related to industrial control systems, the attackers intended to use 
this capability to gather intelligence from a private entity, to aid future attacks on a third party. 
Reports indicate that DUQU 's main goal may have been to steal certificates from trusted CA's, 
which then could be used to sign malicious code [29]. DUQU itself used a valid digital certificate, 
signed with private keys associated with a code signing certificate, issued to a Symantec customer. 
According to Symantec, the private key used for signing Duqu was stolen, and not fraudulently 
generated for the purpose of this malware [28]. 
Before the dust had settled on these attacks,  on June 3d 2012, Microsoft  published a Security 
Advisory  (2718704),  warning  all  users  of  Microsoft  Windows  that  “Unauthorized  Digital 
Certificates Could Allow Spoofing”[30]. A malicious piece of software labeled Flame, was able to 
perform a man in the middle attack on the Windows Update System. When an uninfected computer 
attempted to  perform  an  update, Flame intercepted the request  to  Microsoft  Update server  and 
instead  delivered  a  malicious  executable  to  the  machine  that  was  signed  with  a  rogue,  but 
technically  valid,  Microsoft  certificate.  How  could  this  be  possible?  Back  in  2008  a  team  of 
researchers demonstrated a "collision" attack that generated an SSL certificate authority trusted by 
all major operating systems and browsers. The cryptographic attack, known as an MD5 chosen 
prefix collision, was used by Flame's creators to generate a rogue Microsoft digital code-signing 
certificate that allowed them to distribute the malware to Windows computers as a trusted update 
from Microsoft [31][32]. The attackers took a legitimate Microsoft certificate using MD5 for its 
hash  and  RSA-2048  for  its  public-key  encryption.  They  then  generated  a  similar-but-different 
certificate with the same MD5 hash. This means that the RSA-2048 signature from Microsoft's 
genuine certificate could be grafted into their forged certificate to make it appear valid [33]. 
We are now witnessing occasions in which digital certificates are being spoofed or hijacked and 
then sold on the black market. Αttackers have been successful in misleading trusted CAs, including 
Verisign,  Comodo  and    DigiNotar,  into  issuing  fraudulent  certificates  for  websites,  such  as 
Microsoft and Google. In September 2011, stories surfaced involving DigiNotar, a Dutch “default-
trusted” Root-CA. Apparently, the CA may have been compromised maybe as early as 2009; 531 
false certificates had been issued including certificates for domains such as Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft, Twitter, Mozilla, Mossad, MI6 and the CIA[34][35]. According to a subsequent news 
release, DigiNotar had detected an intrusion into its certificate authority infrastructure as early as 
July 19, 2011 [36]. DigiNotar did not publicly reveal the security breach at the time. After this 
certificate was found, DigiNotar belatedly admitted that dozens of fraudulent certificates had been 
created. In the case of the Diginotar compromise, companies like Microsoft, Google, and Mozilla 
took drastic action by blacklisting all DigiNotar certificates. To do this effectively, Google, and 
Mozilla had to rush out patches that revoked trust in DigiNotar, to protect users from fraudulent or 
malicious sites, using the compromised certificates. On August 29 2011, Microsoft, Mozilla and 
Google blacklisted Diginotar Root CA [37][38]. Opera users were notified of trust related issues 
with the respective certificates (using a “blocked revocation response” feature) when visiting a 
website, and on September 6, 2011 DigiNotar Root was removed [39]. On September 9, 2011, 
Apple issued Security Update 2011-005 for Mac OS X 10.6.8 and 10.7.1, which removed DigiNotar 
from the list of trusted root certificates and EV certificate authorities[40]. Why did users have to wait for an update for their browser or operating system, that revoked the trust to an organization 
they had not selected to trust in the first place? On the 23th March 2011, Comodo also announced 
that an attack had taken place against a Registration Authority (RA), on the 15th of the same month, 
and the attacker managed to issue 9 fraudulent certificates (the breach, which has been branded by 
some as  "comodogate"). These certificates were intended for use in  man-in-the-middle attacks, 
against sites such as mail.google.com, login.yahoo.com and login.live.com [41].A large portion of 
operating systems‟ and browser users had never even heard of DigiNotar or Comodo, until they 
were warned to explicitly change their trust status against them, as they had been compromised. The 
obvious question is “why did we trust them in the first place?”. 
 Organizations of course do make mistakes, and it is irrational to believe that a large organization 
will be able to protect its private keys immaculately. That is why we have certificate revocation lists 
(CRL). But what happens when a CA has been compromised and the revocation list is published 
overdue? Damage control is too late. 
PKI is itself a complex infrastructure; attackers have a multitude of vulnerabilities at their fingertips 
to abuse the overall system. There are several attack methods identified including[42] 
•  Misleading trusted CAs into issuing fraudulent certificates 
•  Compromising a CAs software 
•  Attacking a CAs hardware infrastructure 
•  A government could order a CA within its jurisdiction to produce a malicious cert 
Additionally, as Wood points out [10], automated vetting for digital certificate purchases makes it a 
snap to anonymously set up a phishing or rogue e-commerce site, that is fully equipped with a 
certificate trusted by most major browsers. Malicious code writers are going to great extents to get 
their hands on digital certificates, that can be used for malicious intent. But why is this important? 
 4    Implications and dimensions of “trusting by default” 
Compromised certificates can be used to launch successful man in the middle attacks, intercepting 
user and system communications, but the true implications of this vulnerability are not limited only 
to communication attacks. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts, 
to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted since it 
was signed by use of a cryptographic hash. Digital certificates are used to put trust in the software 
distribution network, but unfortunately this is proving to be a dangerous attack point. Most popular 
operating systems including Microsoft Windows, Linux, as well as Apple Mac OS X, use code 
signing to ensure that it is not possible to maliciously distribute code via the patch system. Popular 
operating  systems  use  software  source  code  signing  for  hardware  driver  verification,  system 
component  verification,  digital  rights,  application  policy  signing  and  kernel  code  signing. 
Microsoft‟s Windows operating system, requires driver signing of system and low level drivers; this 
is called “kernel mode code signing policy”[43]. The kernel-mode code signing policy, requires that 
all kernel-mode code have a digital signature, disallowing any unauthorized or malicious driver to 
be loaded. 
Code signing is an important feature of the security policies of operating systems but what does 
trusted  code  execution  mean?  The  Microsoft  operating  system  Plug  and  Play  manager  can 
successfully verify a digital signature only if both of the following statements are true[44]: 
•  The signing certificate that was used to create the signature was issued by a certification 
authority (CA). 
•  The corresponding root certificate for the CA is installed in the Trusted Root Certification 
Authorities certificate store. 
The downside is that an end user does not decide which software is trusted, but his operating system 
does it on his behalf. Software bearing a valid digital signature however, should not mean that the end-user or a system administrator implicitly trusts the software publisher. A user or administrator 
should decide on whether to install or run an application on a case-by-case basis, based on their 
knowledge of the software publisher and application[45]. But this is not the case for software which 
carries a certificate whose trusted root path ends at a trusted Root CA included in the trusted root 
store. This software is silently deemed as trustworthy by the users OS, without any notification or 
warning. According to Microsoft, drivers that have been signed by a “Windows Publisher“ or by a 
trusted  publisher,  do  not  display  a  dialog  box  or  warning  message  for  driver  packages  [46]. 
Standard users can install drivers from trusted publishers, but only administrative users receive the 
prompts that allow them to install drivers from a publisher of unknown trust. For nonadministrative 
users, Windows silently refuses to install drivers from those categories. 
This  trust  by  default  status,  in  the  eyes  of  malicious  code  developers,  presents  an  excellent 
opportunity to install malicious modules silently. The belief that code signing can ensure that it is 
not  possible  to  maliciously  distribute  code  via  the  patch  system  of  operating  systems  was 
conceptually reversed. Code signing was used to distribute malicious software via the patch system 
without  ringing  the  alarm.  The  Flame  malicious  software  was  able  to  successfully  attack  the 
Windows  Update  Service.  When  a  system  on  a  network  attempts  to  connect  to  Microsoft‟s 
Windows Update service, the connection got redirected through an infected system, which sent a 
fake, malicious Windows Update to the requesting machine. The fake update claims to be code that 
will  help  display  gadgets  on  a  user‟s  desktop.  If  the  ruse  works,  a  malicious  file  named 
“WuSetupV.exe” gets deposited on the machine. Since the file is signed with a fake Microsoft 
certificate, it appears to  the user to  be legitimate, and therefore  the user‟s  machine allows the 
program to run on the machine without issuing any desktop warning [47]. In terms of architecture, 
the attack vector used by Duqu and Stuxnet is similar; it installs signed kernel drivers to decrypt and 
load DLL files. This is a signed driver file, which loads a main module designed as an encrypted 
library. At the same time, there is a separate configuration file for the whole malicious complex and 
an encrypted block in the system registry, that defines the location of the module being loaded and 
name of the process for injection[48].  
Such attacks are not limited to operating systems. Other popular driver signing examples, include 
ActiveX and signed Java applets. Although these technologies are becoming obsolete (soon to be 
replaced by HTML5) they are still in circulation. In essence, when a user navigates to a website 
including an ActiveX control with a valid signature from a trusted source, it can be automatically 
downloaded and executed by Internet Explorer. Once downloaded, the control in effect becomes a 
part of the operating system [49]. ActiveX controls that bear a valid certificate are installed without 
warning or any notification to the user [43]. These controls have been a major source of security 
problems. Security holes are continually being found in one ActiveX component or the other and 
they are a favorite target of malware writers. Microsoft has added a new feature called ActiveX 
Filtering that can block all ActiveX controls from working within the browser using a single switch.  
A  more secure approach is taken towards Java Applets. Starting with version 1.1, Java included 
support for signed applets. These applets, which can run in  your web browser as the result of 
viewing a web page, are not limited by any sandbox and can do just about anything that native code 
can. In other words, a signed Java applet should be treated the same as an EXE file on Windows. 
Applets, therefore, are considered by default to be untrusted. When users of Java Plug-in encounter 
an RSA signed applet, the Plug-in will verify whether[50]: 
1. The applet is correctly signed 
2. The RSA certificate chain and Root CA are valid 
If the applet is correctly signed and the RSA certificate chain and Root CA are valid, the Plug-in 
will pop-up a security dialog telling the user and providing four options: Grant always, Grant this 
session, Deny, View Issuer. 
To  help  describe  and  assess  the  impact  of  this  problem  we  have  a  adopted  the  “vulnerability scorecard  approach”,  described  in  [51]  which  implements  the  goal-question-metric  (QGM) 
technique  for  better  reporting  of  security  vulnerabilities  by  users  and  security  advisories.  This 
analysis uses security advisories published on related “unauthorized digital certificates derived from 
trusted CAs” attacks[37][38][39][40][41] to clarify the implications of the aforementioned problem.  
Perspective  Severity  Description 
Target  High  All operating systems (including 
servers)  and  web  browsers  that 
contain  the  CA  in  the  default 
trusted root 
Applicability  High  All  operating  systems,  servers  
and  web  browsers  that  contain 
the CA in the default trusted root 
Preconditions  High  If  compromised  CA  root 
certificate  included  in  trusted 
root store 
Organizational  Moderate  In  various  occasions  CA  have 
withheld related information for 
a long period of time.  
Exploitation Impact  High  Users  on  a  compromised 
network  could  be  directed  to 
sites  using  a  fraudulent 
certificate and mistake them for 
the legitimate sites. It may also 
deceive  users  into  downloading 
malware  if  they  believe  it‟s 
coming  from  a  trusted  site.  In 
many  occasions  malware  could 
be  silently  installed  on  all 
affected systems.  
Community Impact  High  This  could  deceive  users  into 
revealing  personal  information 
such  as  usernames  and 
passwords.  Financial  losses  are 
very likely.  
Solution Requirements  High  Specifically untrusting Root CA 
and  disallowing  automatic  root 
updates. Patch necessary.  
 Solution Impact  Moderate  In  the  possibility  that  the 
automatic  update  is  turned  off 
certificate management in highly 
complex  and  unusable.  Related 
websites may be blocked. Patch 
can be installed automatically.  
Conclusions  High  Critical trust limitation 
Table 1“Vulnerability scorecard approach” for threats related to unauthorized digital certificates 
derived from CAs included in Trusted Root Store  4.1   Coercing the Trust 
Trusting by default a number of organizations, which a user may never interact with, introduces an 
unnecessary  risk.  An  attentive  or  suspicious  user  may  require  to  take  control  over  this  trust 
delegation by deleting or revoking a number of these trusted by default root CA's. What he or she 
will find out is that this is almost impossible, as end users may actually lack any control over these 
trusted relationships. In the case that a user requires to participate in these trust decisions, he is met 
with a number of obstacles that we shall describe below. 
A user requiring to delete all trusted certification authorities from any of the trusted root repositories 
will soon realize that this is certainly not a straightforward task. In some cases, selecting to delete a 
certificate has no effect whatsoever; users are deceived into believing that their action had some 
kind of effect. In other cases, a user may believe that a certificate has actually been deleted only to 
find that it has automatically reappeared after a while. In Windows operating systems, when a user 
visits a secure Web site (by using HTTPS SSL), reads a secure email (S/MIME), or downloads an 
ActiveX control that is signed (code signing) or encounters a new root certificate, an automatic 
update process is triggered that reinstalls all CA certificates in the trusted repository[52]. In some 
cases these certificates even automatically update to their predefined trust status. The user is not 
notified of these modifications. An expert user may select to disable the Update Root Certificates 
feature (which is turned on by default) through Group Policy. This is of course a task, not directed 
at an average user, who is unaware even of the existence of such a feature. In this case, if the user is 
presented with a certificate issued by a root certification authority that is not directly trusted, and 
the Update Root Certificates feature is turned off through Group Policy, the user can be prevented 
from  completing  the  action  that  required  authentication[53].  For  example,  the  user  may  be 
prevented from installing software, viewing an encrypted or digitally signed e-mail message, or 
using a browser to engage in an SSL session. 
Certificates that are included in our browsers and operating systems, are associated with a number 
of purposes, which include, server authentication; client authentication; code signing; secure email; 
time stamping; trust list signing; domain name system server trust etc. A user may select to edit the 
trust on all default trusted CAs and only retrust on occasion. This is extremely cumbersome, as 
there is no option available to remove trust from all CA's and reedit on occasion. If a security 
sensitive user required to “untrust” all trusted root certificates and selects to trust by decision, this is 
simply  unmanageable.  A  user  is  prevented  altogether  from  updating  or  installing  software  or 
visiting SSL enabled websites that use these certificates. At this point a user is not presented with an 
“re-trust” message or even if an permanent exception can be added it seems to still bring up future 
notifications. Untrusting all Certification Authorities you do not interact with is highly complex. A 
user  could  decide  to  explicitly  edit  the  trust  on  specific  certificates.  Managing  certificates 
individually can be a laborious, if not an impossible, task. 
 5   A community contributed approach to trust 
It  is  clear  that  “Trust  by  Default”  is  dangerous  and  often  abused.  At  the  early  stages  of  PKI 
development, it helped get past a number of interoperability issues. Today it is a dangerous relic. 
Our current transactions with digital certificates coerce users trust. Users trust is silently delegated 
down long chains to organizations with questionable conduct. We need to build trust on occasion. 
User  interfaces  and  configuration  files  need  to  exhibit  this  principle  and  avoid  misleading  or 
delegating trust judgments, as this is the attack vector which is being exploited. But how can we 
achieve this? 
It is often stated that users lack the necessary understanding and capabilities, or even the interest, to 
effectively manage the certificates that are necessary to them. But until recently this belief held for 
computers all-together. We need to build in the direction of enabling users to make these decisions 
effectively. As a result, the aim of the proposed approach is twofold. Firstly, it is crucial we enhance the usability of digital certificates and provide the necessary tools 
which will foster learning. It is broadly recognized that one of the major challenges for the effective 
deployment  of  information  security  systems  is  getting  people  to  use  them  correctly  [23].  The 
emerging interdisciplinary field of HCI-SEC (Human-Computer Interaction and Security) or usable 
security, has demonstrated that users actively avoid security mechanisms that are difficult to use, 
and/or make mistakes that undermine security [8].It is evident that PKI in its essential form, appears 
to be greatly dysfunctional in every day environments, not due to the inherent complexity of the 
underlying  mathematics,  but  due  to  the  intricacy  of  the  application  user  interfaces,  lack  of 
awareness and risk acknowledgment on a user side. These interactions need to be redesigned with 
respect to HCI, accessibility and usability in order to enhance overall electronic security and make 
efficient use of digital certificates. Managing digital certificates root store and trust interactions, 
should be a straightforward task. If a user deletes a Root CA, he/she does not want it to silently 
reappear (with all trust bits enabled) in the near future. A redesign of digital certificate interface and 
interactions is a sine qua non for the future of PKI. 
Secondly  and  most  crucially  we  need  to  build  a  community  contributed  approach  to  digital 
certificates management. The decision making process needs to be distributed to a community of 
contributors, rather than a centralized authority, thus achieving openness and transparency. Trust 
needs to be developed in a public and collaborative manner. In accordance with full disclosure of 
security vulnerabilities, versus a security-by-obscurity approach, communication mechanisms must 
be in place for the organizational system to exchange relevant information with its environment.  
Open  data  provides  an  unprecedented  opportunity  for  societies  to  move  towards  transparency, 
evidence-based decisions, enhanced cohesion, public engagement and trust [54]. Publicly available 
open data needs to guide user judgment on trust relations. Following a bottom-up approach, users 
participate in the decision-making regarding the trustworthiness of CAs and their related trust bits 
that shall be included in their personal root store. In the case that a user lacks the information to 
participate  effectively  in  such  a  process,  trust  can  be  decided  (or  suggested)  on  the  specific 
characteristics  of  the  user  (personalised  trust),  such  as  location,  expertise,  usage,  nature  of 
transactions, corporate or private. Implicated parties must have the tools at hand to blacklist and 
effectively delete a selected CA. It is critical that we build a decentralized source of information of 
security breaches and compromises. 
In the frame of this work a software toolkit for evaluating and managing trust relationships between 
relying parties was built, aimed at supporting average users trust judgments regarding the validity of 
specific public key certificates. The proposed experimental software environment includes a web-
based  tool  with  the  ability  to  gather  information  related  to  Certification  Authorities  and  their 
transactions, in a crowdsourcing method. The proposed solution benefits from a distributed problem 
solving model used to build an open information repository on the trustworthiness of CAs included 
in a user‟s trusted repository. Any implicated party (including users but also trusted third parties) 
have the ability to report incidents, blacklist CAs but also whitelist CAs for best practices. The 
information gathered is used to provide users with information regarding certificate transactions but 
also helps generate a personalized/customized user certificate repository for user download, based 
on a series of filters. 
This software provides  a graphical visualization of trust  relations in the form of an interactive 
network graph with related information for user evaluation (Figure 2). A user has the ability to 
navigate the graph for information related to a certain CA and its subordinates, which are involved 
in his/her recent transactions. By clicking on a CA, the user can report an incident or just confirm 
his trust to the specific CA path.  
Figure 2. A graphical visualization of trust relations in the form of an interactive network graph 
with related information for user evaluation 
The  set  up  includes  the  implementation  of  a  mechanism  with  the  ability  to  build  personalized 
trusted root repositories, containing a filtered list of CAs according to user preferences.  
A  user  provides  information  in  a  simple  form  which  is  used  to  build  a  custom  user  profile, 
according to a list of criteria, such as: 
  Location. Where a user is geographically located?  
  User‟s Common  Tasks.  What  are  the  common  tasks  this  user  performs  on  the  web  (e-
banking, ecommerce, social media)? 
  Computer Accessibility. Is it a private or public computer? 
  Platform. What kind of platform is the user using? 
The information gathered is used to generate a report which is then used to create a 
customized/personalized certificate repository (*.p7b) for download. Using the users profile we are 
able to create a certificate repository containing CAs related to his answers and preferences. The 
approach is able to overcome many of the security issues regarding trust by default, as a user is only 
trusting CA‟s he/she often transacts with, as demonstrated by the following examples: 
  A user located in the US who does not trade with other countries has no reason to include 
TurkCert of Turkey, Chunghwa Telecom of Taiwan and others in the Trusted CA repository. 
  A user working on a Linux workstation, possibly does not interact with a Microsoft trusted 
software publisher. Such a CA does not need to be trusted by default.  
  A  user  working  on  a  public  computer  should  only  trust  the  CA  used  in  his  current 
transaction and nothing else. 
  A user who does not use e-commerce web sites does not need to trust CAs established 
specifically for economic transactions. 
Additionally, the certificate repository can be further filtered, at the discretion of the user, who has 
access to information related to the reliability of the CA, such as: 
  CA Reputation  
o  How many security incidents have been reported over a specified period of time?  o  How many certificates have been revoked over a period of time  
  CA Reliability  
o  Has the CAs infrastructure been put at risk?  
o  Have there been any falsely issued certificates?    
o  CA Openness/transparency of operations 
  CA Accountability and Responsiveness 
o  Can the CA be held accountable for security related issues? 
o  How fast did the CA respond to security incidents? 
  CA Referral Status 
o  What is the referral status of this CA by our users? 
o  Has anyone whitelisted this CA? 
o  Has anyone blacklisted this CA?  
The application was built using the ASP.NET MVC 4 (Model View Controller) framework. The 
ASP.NET MVC 4 is a framework for building scalable, standards-based web applications using 
well-established  design  patterns,  that  places  an  emphasis  on  a  loosely  coupled  application 
architecture  and  highly  maintainable  code  [55][56].  The  Model-View-Controller  pattern  is  an 
architectural pattern that encourages strict isolation between the individual parts of an application. 
This  isolation  is  better  known  as  separation  of  concerns,  or,  in  more  general  terms,  “loose 
coupling”. The MVC pattern splits an application into three layers: the model, the view, and the 
controller. The model represents core business logic and data. Models encapsulate the properties 
and  behavior  of  a  domain  entity  and  expose  properties  that  describe  the  entity.  The  proposed 
solution contains models encapsulating users, certificates, reviews, CAs and  revocation related data 
(details in table 2). The view in MVC is responsible for transforming a model or models into a 
visual representation. In web applications, this most often means generating HTML to be rendered 
in the user‟s browser, although views can manifest in many forms. The models are rendered into 
HTML  forms  for  data  entry,  data  visualization,  but  also  are  used  to  generate  the  visual  graph 
(Figure  2).  The  controller,  essentially  C#  code,  controls  the  application  logic  and  acts  as  the 
coordinator between the view and the model. Controllers receive input from users via the view, and 
then work with the model to perform specific actions, passing the results back to the view. 
ASP.NET  includes  the  System.Security  namespaces  and  specifically  the 
System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates  namespace,  which  contains  the  runtime 
implementation and methods for reading, storing and managing digital certificates[57] [58]. Within 
a dedicated controller in C# and using the X509Certificate and X509Certificate2 classes, we are 
able to read all fields of a given certificate retrieved by the implementation and validate a certificate 
against a given CRL.  The X509Certificate type amongst others, exposes the methods GetNameInfo 
(gets the subject and issuer names from a certificate.), GetPublicKey (returns the public key for the 
X.509v3  certificate),  GetSerialNumber  (returns  the  serial  number  of  the  X.509v3  certificate), 
GetExpirationDateString (returns the expiration date of this X.509v3 certificate) and the certificate 
Verify method, which performs a X.509 chain validation[59].  We are able to build a “certificate 
model”  within  the  MVC  framework,  which  is  then  rendered  into  HTML  forms  for  data 
visualization, using the ASP NET chart control. The X509Chain class (represents a chain-building 
engine for X509Certificate2 certificates) in combination with the X509Store class are used to build 
a user store repository. The RepositoryBuilderController is capable of building a user repository on 
request  according  to  user  input  from  reviews  and  common  incidents  reported.  At  this  point  a 
verification process is triggered where the validity of the certificate is verified (e.g. ChainPolicy. 
X509RevocationMode.Online).  If  no  flags  are  raised  a  custom  user  repository  is  build  and  is available for download by the user. User input is collected via a dedicated view which then is able 
to serialize related data. The MVC framework uses the ADO.NET Entity Framework (EF) to access 
an  SQL  Server  database  using  strongly  typed  C#  code.  Entity  Framework  (EF)  is  an  object-
relational mapper that enables .NET developers to work with relational data using domain-specific 
objects.   
 
Model  Model Properties 
UserData  UserId, Name, Surname, Email, Address, County, State, Country 
UserWorkstation  WorkstationName,  WorkstationId,  CommonTasks,  Computer 
Accessibility, Operating System 
UserSecurity  PasswordId, PasswordHash 
CertificateData  Extensions, FriendlyName, Issuer, IssuerName, NotAfter, NotBefore, 
PrivateKey, PublicKey, RawData, SerialNumber, SignatureAlgorithm, 
Subject,  SubjectName,  Thumbprint,  Version,  Limitations, 
CommonUsage,    CRL  Distribution  Point,  CRL  Distribution 
Point_Name    
Certification Authority  CAId, CAName, CACountry, CADescription, SubordinateId, Status 
Review  ReviewId, Rating, Body, IncidentReport, Whitelist, Blacklist 
RevocationList  RevId, Data, Body 
Audit  AuditId, Audit, Results 
TTP  TTPId, TTPName, TTPUrl, TTPReviewID 
Table 2 MVC solution models and properties 
 6   Analysis and Future works 
Trust by default presents an obvious source of exploitation. In our research we have concluded that 
in the name of usability, a number of critical trusted decisions have been delegated to third parties. 
This  delegation  presents  a  critical  vulnerability.  User  settings  are  erroneously  maintained  in  a 
method to mislead users into trust decisions and automate as much as possible these decisions 
  A large number of Trusted Root CAs is included in the Root Repository many of which a 
user may never need. 
  Users are misled to believing that they can delete CA root CAs. This has almost no actual 
effect. 
  Root CA's are updated without any user consent. To the user, a successful root update is 
seamless.  The  user  does  not  see  any  security  dialog  boxes  or  warnings.  The  download 
happens automatically. 
  Managing trust interactions is a highly complicated process for the end user. 
  Users are unable to trust on interaction. 
  If the user disables automatic root update, he may be utterly unable to complete the required 
task. If the user is presented with a certificate issued by a root certification authority, that is 
not directly trusted, and the Update Root Certificates feature is turned off through Group 
Policy, the user can be prevented from completing the action that required authentication. 
For example, the user can be prevented from installing software, viewing an encrypted or digitally signed e-mail message, or using a browser to engage in an SSL session 
  It is not clear to an end user how many root repositories exist 
  Software signed from a trusted root CAs is executed automatically. 
  Default settings for ActiveX are execute trusted CAs source code 
Within  this  context  we  proposed  a  simple  framework  with  the  ability  to  help  counter  various 
vulnerabilities related to trust by default. The proposed deployment is a web based decision support 
tool that can be used to support users trust judgments, regarding the validity of specific CAs and 
public key certificates. In addition to traditional methods, information regarding CA‟s is gathered in 
a crowdsourcing method, so as to support a transparent decision making process, distributing the 
task across a plethora of collaborators. We analyzed the proposed framework in terms of efficiency 
and effectiveness by requesting various users to test it within our research lab. The experimental 
results only conﬁrm the necessity of increasing the usability, but also user awareness regarding 
digital  certificates  and  implicated  vulnerabilities.  Although  users  were  mostly  capable  of 
performing simple tasks and could create a customized root store, they were not able to grasp the 
necessity of the process. Most users were unable to manage digital certificates in a successful way 
and were unaware of the inherent complexities and vulnerabilities related to trust decisions. During 
this process it was necessary to inform users of basic usages of digital certificates and methods by 
which these trust decisions can potentially be manipulated. Although expert users were able to make 
use of the tool and many contributed by reporting various CA related incidents, the average and 
below average users, were unable to understand the necessity of the task. Even though the proposed 
solution is capable of providing users with a customized root store, thus mitigating various serious 
vulnerabilities previously documented, users seemed to have difficulties using this root store. It is 
thus deemed essential that increasing the usability of digital certificates and related trust interactions 
is a “sine qua non” for the future of PKI and online security. Future works, should be focused on 
methodologies  and  technologies  with  the  ability  of  increasing  the  user-friendliness  of  digital 
certificates.  
 7   Conclusions 
In this article, we have attempted to shed light on the true implications of “trust by default” in PKI 
environments. We attempt to raise awareness about the severity of these kinds of trust delegations, 
demystify the security challenges and identify unique security threats. We support the doctrine that 
trust  should  be  built  on  informed  judgment  and  this  can  only  be  achieved  through  increased 
openness. Following this, we put forward for consideration a number of proposals that attempt to 
overcome the issue at hand. The proposal is twofold. Firstly, we propose increasing the usability of 
digital certificates and related trust interactions, as this is a sine qua non for the future of PKI and 
online security. Secondly, we support the doctrine that trust should be built on informed judgment 
and  this  can  only  be  achieved  through  increased  openness,  and  bring  forward  a  proposal  of 
achieving this. In the near future it is almost for sure that we are going to witness an increase in 
attacks  on  Certifications  Authorities  and  trust  interactions,  it  is  necessary  we  take  action  in 
increasing  solution  effectiveness.    Within  this  context,  we  propose  a  simple  experimental 
mechanism that is able to provide users with customized digital certificate repositories based on a 
crowdsourcing method.  
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